BURKE V. KODAK AND THE

SPD CIRCUIT SPLIT

Michael Cavadelt
On January 12, 2004, the United States Supreme Court denied a
petition for writ of certiorari filed in Burke v. Kodak Retirement Income
Plan.1 In its refusal to revisit the Second Circuit's decision, the Court left
the fate of millions of employees, as well as a three-way circuit split,
unresolved. While this outcome may be viewed as unfortunate, it certainly
was not unexpected, as the issue of the appropriate standard for recovery
under a deficient summary plan description ("SPD") has puzzled courts for
nearly two decades.2 The result has been a patchwork of legal authority, in
which the ability of a plaintiff to recover equitable relief does not depend
upon the strength of his case, but rather upon the jurisdiction in which he
brings suit. In this Comment, I will demonstrate how the statutory
definition of a summary plan description has led to the current confusion
regarding what constitutes a deficient summary plan description.
Furthermore, I will examine the legal theories behind the three-way circuit
split over the proper standard of recovery under a deficient summary plan
description. Finally, I will give my own recommendations on which
standard should be universally adopted.
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

A. Summary Plan Descriptionsunder ERISA
As their name implies, summary plan descriptions are documents
outlining the coverage provided by employee benefits plans. Following the
enactment of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA"), SPDs have become the keystone of ERISA's disclosure
requirements.3 Currently, millions of employee benefits plan participants
and their beneficiaries depend upon SPDs to remain informed of updates in
their benefits plans. However, despite their importance, SPDs remain
t Candidate, J.D. 2005, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1. 336 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2003) cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1046 (2004).
2. One of the first cases to tackle the issue of the appropriate standard for recovery
under a deficient SPD was Govoni v. Bricklayers, Masons and PlasterersInt'l Union, Local
No. 5 Pension Fund, 732 F.2d 250, 252 (1st Cir. 1984).
3. 60A AM. JUR. 2D Pensions and Retirement Funds § 783 (2003).
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steeped in controversy, and this debate has arguably undermined the role
that Congress originally envisioned for them.
Much of the confusion surrounding SPDs can be traced back to
Congress's definition of summary plan descriptions in ERISA, or more
appropriately, the lack thereof. Unlike numerous other essential terms,4
there is no explicit definition for the phrase "summary plan description" in
ERISA. Instead, Congress outlined several categories of information that
could be included in a proper SPD:
(1) the name and type of administration of the plan; (2) the name
and address of the person designated as agent for the service of
legal process; (3) the name and address of the administrator; (4)
the names, titles and addresses of any trustee or trustees; (5) a
description of the relevant provisions of any applicable collective
bargaining agreement; (6) the plan's requirements respecting
eligibility for participation and benefits; (7) a description of the
provisions providing for non-forfeitable pension benefits; (8) the
circumstances which may result in disqualification, ineligibility,
or denial or loss of benefits; (9) the source of financing of the
plan and the identity of any organization through which benefits
are provided; (10) the date of the end of the plan year and
whether the records of the plan are kept on a calendar, policy, or
fiscal year basis; (11) the procedures to be followed in presenting
claims for benefits under the plan; and (12) the remedies
available under the plan for redress or claims which are denied.5
These guidelines, as well as the corresponding administrative regulations
instituted by the Department of Labor ("DOL") in 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3,
only created more questions than they did answers. For example, did
Congress intend for plan documents that contain eleven of the twelve
categories to be considered SPDs? What about documents that contain
eight of the categories? Should plan documents stating to be an SPD, yet
lacking several categories of information, still be classified as an SPD? In
adopting guidelines, rather than a uniform definition for SPDs, Congress
shifted the burden to the courts to answer these questions. As a result, two
competing and different theories have emerged for identifying SPDs under

4. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2000) (defining "employee welfare benefit plan" and
"employee pension benefit plan"); 29 U.S.C. § 1167 (2000) (defining "group health plan");
29 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000) (defining "insurer" and "guaranteed benefit policy"); see also 60A
AM. JUR. 2D Pensions and Retirement Funds § 783 (2003).
5. Gridley v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 924 F.2d 1310, 1316 (3d Cir. 1991)
(summarizing 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b) (1974)).
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ERISA.6
In Gridley v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., the Third Circuit adopted a
fact-intensive test when finding that a plan document entitled "Employee
Benefits Summary" and claiming to provide "quick reference" information
for a benefits plan that should not be considered an SPD under the
guidelines in ERISA ("the Gridley test").7 In doing so, the court
specifically mentioned four factors that it had relied upon to make its
decision: 1) that no reasonable plan participant could have considered the
brochure to be an SPD because it referred readers to their "summary plan
descriptions or official plan documents for more details;" 2) that the
brochure lacked all but two of the categories of information required under
ERISA; 3) that the brochure's terms contained areas covered by existing
SPDs; and 4) that the brochure was clearly an updated version of an older
document not considered an SPD. 8 The Gridley test therefore calls on
future courts to review the language in plan documents, as well as the
context under which they were written, in order to determine whether they
qualify as SPDs.
In Hicks v. Fleming Cos., the Fifth Circuit specifically rejected the
Gridley test as a result of the court's concerns that it would create an
opportunity for inconsistency among the circuits. 9 Instead, the Fifth Circuit
adopted a bright-line rule requiring that SPDs must contain "all or
substantially all categories of information" required by ERISA and the
DOL ("the Hicks test") 1 ° In support of its rule, the court cited Congress's
strict filing requirements for SPDs," holding that "[i]f a document is to be
afforded the legal effects of an SPD... that document should be sufficient
to constitute an SPD for filing and qualification purposes."' 2
However, the Fifth Circuit allowed for one possible exception to its
bright-line rule. In dicta, the court stated that if a situation arose in which
the plan administrators had intended a plan document to serve as an SPD,
yet had accidentally omitted one of the categories of information, the
document may still be able to be classified as an SPD 3 Given that this
was dicta, it remains to be seen whether a future court would choose to
follow the Fifth Circuit's suggestion.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Hicks v. Fleming Cos., 961 F.2d 537, 541-42 (5th Cir. 1992).
Gridley, 924 F.2d at 1312.
Id. at 1316-17.
Hicks, 961 F.2d at 542.
Id. (summarizing 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b)).
See discussion infra Part I.B.
Id.
Id.
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B. Filingand DistributionRequirementsfor SPDs
Further complicating the situation are the strict filing and distribution
requirements enacted by Congress. Under ERISA, an SPD must be filed
with the Secretary of Labor within 120 days after the employee benefits
plan becomes subject to the statute. 4 In addition, plan administrators are
also required to provide a current SPD to every plan participant and their
beneficiaries. 15 Plan administrators who fail or neglect to perform either of
these duties may face civil liability for participants' lost benefits, in
addition to a maximum fine of $1,000 a day. 6
Congress designed these requirements to protect the interests of plan
participants from the potential actions of unscrupulous plan administrators.
However, without the presence of a universal standard for identifying
SPDs, any plan administrator could be held liable or fined under these
requirements. This is due to a problem not envisioned by Congress when
enacting the filing and distribution guidelines. By the time a court has
determined that a plan document is an SPD, ERISA's filing and
distribution requirements have already been violated. While I am not
aware of any cases in which a court has employed such a strict
interpretation of ERISA, it is hard to see how a court relying upon the
statute's plain language would be able to avoid unjustly punishing plan
administrators technical, although unintentional violations of ERISA.
II. THE PROBLEM OF DEFICIENT SPDs

With all of the confusion surrounding the fundamental issue of
determining when an SPD exists, it is no wonder that the courts have had
difficulty resolving cases involving deficient SPDs. There are several ways
in which an SPD can be deficient. For example, terms may be missing
from the SPD, sections of the SPD may be ambiguous, or the SPD could
directly conflict with the master policy. ERISA is silent on what should
occur in the event that an SPD is deficient. Therefore, it has been left to
the courts to determine 1) what terms should control in the event of a
deficient SPD, and 2) what plaintiffs must prove in order to recover lost
benefits because of a deficient SPD.
A. The Deficient SPD Always Control
Most of the circuit courts have adopted a bright-line rule that in the
case of a deficient SPD, the terms of the SPD will control over those in the
14. 29 U.S.C. § 1024 (2000).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a) (2000).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(2) (2000).
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master policy. 7 While such a rule may appear counterintuitive, the courts
have relied upon ERISA's plain meaning, legislative intent, and general
principles of public policy to justify the rule. Thus, the courts have held
that such a rule is necessary in order to protect the millions of employees
who rely upon
SPDs as the only source of information regarding their
18
benefit plans.
Many courts have relied upon the plain language of ERISA when
adopting the bright-line rule. Under ERISA's requirements, an SPD must
be "'accurate' and 'sufficiently comprehensive' to reasonably apprise
[benefits plan] participants of their rights and obligations under the plan."' 9
This led the Fifth Circuit, in Hansen v. ContinentalInsurance Co., to reject
a defendant's claim that the master policy should control when there is a
conflict between the master policy and the SPD.20 As the court found, such
a rule would "eviscerate" ERISA's SPD requirements, and thus directly
contradict the plain meaning of ERISA's guidelines.2'
In addition, courts have relied upon ERISA's legislative intent as
supporting a bright-line rule that the deficient SPD will always control. In
Edwards v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the court quoted
a statement made during the adoption of ERISA, as support of the bright
line rule, "[i]t is grossly unfair to ...disqualify [an employee] from
benefits if ...[the] conditions [which led to the disqualification] were
22
stated in a misleading or incomprehensible manner in the plan booklets.
Thus, there appears to be support for such a rule in the legislative intent
behind ERISA's adoption.
Finally, the courts have relied upon general principles of public policy
in order to support the bright-line rule. In an often reproduced passage
from McKnight v. Southern Life and Health Insurance Co.,23 the Eleventh
Circuit found that "[i]t is of no effect to publish and distribute a plan

17. Of the circuit courts, the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh have all adopted similar rules. See, e.g., Burke v. Kodak Ret.
Income Plan, 336 F.3d 103, 113 (2d Cir. 2003); Burstein v. Ret. Account Plan for
Employees of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research Found., 334 F.3d 365, 378 (3d Cir.
2003); Pierce v. Sec. Trust Life Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 23, 27 (4th Cir. 1992); Hansen v. Cont'l
Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971, 982 (5th Cir. 1991); Edwards v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 851
F.2d 134, 136 (6th Cir. 1988); Senkier v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 948 F.2d 1050,
1051 (7th Cir. 1991); Barker v. Ceridian Corp., 122 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 1997); Atwood
v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317, 1321 (9th Cir. 1995); Chiles v. Ceridian Corp., 95
F.3d 1505, 1515 (10th Cir. 1996).
18. Burke, 336 F.3d at 110.
19. Hansen, 940 F.2d at 981-82 (quotation marks omitted) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Edwards, 851 F.2d at 136 (alteration in original) (citing H. R. Rep. No. 93-533
(1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4646).
23. 758 F.2d 1566 (11th Cir. 1985).

144

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW - [Vol. 7:1

summary booklet designed to simplify and explain a voluminous and
complex document, and then proclaim that any inconsistencies will be
governed by the plan. Unfairness will flow to the employee for reasonably
relying on the summary booklet., 24 The courts have also used similar
arguments for resolving any ambiguities that may be found in the deficient
SPD. Relying upon contract theory, some courts have used contra
proferentem, holding that any ambiguities in the document should be
decided against the parties who drafted it.25 This rationale was employed
by the Third Circuit in Burstein v. Retirement Account Planfor Employees
of Allegheny Health Education and Research Foundation, when it found
that "[i]f an SPD conflicts with a plan document, then a court should read
the terms of the 'contract' to include the terms of a plan document, as
superseded and modified by conflicting language in the SPD. 26
However, there is at least one possible exception to the rule. In
Burstein, the court found that the use of a disclaimer stating that "the
'[P]lan [D]ocument always governs' might have provided notice to
employees that they could not fully rely upon the SPD. 7 Ultimately,
though, the Third Circuit held that the exception was not applicable in that
28
case because of the original plan's relatively inaccessibility to employees.
29
control.
still
would
terms
SPD's
the
Therefore, despite the disclaimer
B. The AppropriateStandardof Recovery
Yet, while most circuits are in agreement that the terms of the
deficient SPD control over the master policy, it has been much harder for
the courts to devise a uniform standard for recovery under a deficient SPD.
Currently, there is a three-way circuit split regarding this issue, resulting in
the adoption of three significantly different standards: detrimental reliance;
reliance or possible prejudice; neither reliance nor prejudice.
1. The "Detrimental Reliance" Standard
Under the standard adopted by the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, plan
participants must prove detrimental reliance in order to recover under a
deficient SPD. 30 Detrimental reliance requires plaintiffs to show that they
24. Id. at 1570.
25. Rhorer v. Raytheon Eng'rs and Constructors, Inc., 181 F.3d 634, 642 (5th Cir.
1999) (citing Hansen, 940 F.2d at 981).
26. Burstein v. Ret. Account Plan for Employees of Allegheny Health Educ. &
Research Found., 334 F.3d 365, 381 (3d Cir. 2003).
27. Id. at 379.
28. Id. at 381.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Andersen v. Chrysler Corp., 99 F.3d 846, 859 (7th Cir. 1996) (refusing to
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"took action, resulting in some detriment, that they would not [otherwise]
have taken."'', The Eleventh Circuit has outlined its reasons for adopting
this stringent standard by finding that anything less would impose a form of
strict liability upon the plan administrators.32 Furthermore, in Branch v. G.
Bernd Co., the court responded to attacks by other circuits which claimed
that detrimental reliance went against ERISA's objectives by imposing
technical judicial barriers to prevent plan participants from bringing suits
against plan administrator:33
[W]e do not share the.., belief that we would undermine
Congress' objectives by requiring beneficiaries to prove reliance
on inaccurate plan summaries. Congress ...required employers
to provide their employees with accurate and understandable
summary plan descriptions because it wanted "to protect the
beneficiaries of benefit plans by insuring that employees are fully
and accurately apprised of their rights under the plan." (citations
omitted). Of course, when an employer provides an inaccurate
plan summary, the beneficiaries who rely on that summary are
not accurately apprised of their rights. But when a beneficiary
fails to read or rely on the summary, whether it is accurate or not,
the beneficiary also prevents full appraisal of the rights under the
plan. Beneficiaries must do their part if Congress' objective is to
be met.34
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit has clearly set out its reasons for supporting the
adoption of a detrimental reliance standard.
The Seventh Circuit's rationale for adopting a detrimental reliance
standard echoed the reasons established by the Eleventh Circuit. In
Andersen v. Chrysler Corp., the court found that there would be no cause
of action under ERISA for technical violations of ERISA.35 The court held
that plan participants must demonstrate "bad faith, active concealment or
detrimental reliance ... ." in order to recover equitable relief.36 Thus,
while both courts have adopted the detrimental reliance standard, it appears
find detrimental reliance where there has been a technical violation of ERISA's notification
requirements); Branch v. G. Bernd Co., 955 F.2d 1574, 1579 (11 th Cir. 1992) (finding that
reliance on a plan summary must be shown).
31. Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 1512, 1520 (8th Cir. 1988)
(alteration in original) (citing Monson v. Century Mfg. Co., 739 F.2d 1293, 1302 (8th Cir.
1984)).
32. Branch, 955 F.2d at 1578.
33. Id. at 1579.
34. Id. (internal citations omitted).
35. 99 F.3d at 859.
36. Id.
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that the Seventh Circuit would require a finding similar to fraud on the part
of the plan administrators before the court would allow a plan participant to
recover under a deficient SPD.
2. The "Reliance or Possible Prejudice" Standard
Following the lead of the First Circuit in Govoni v. Bricklayers,
Masons and Plasterers International Union of America, Local No. 5
Pension Fund, the Fourth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits have held that in order
to "secure relief, . .. [a plaintiff] must show some significant reliance
37
upon, or possible prejudice flowing from, the faulty plan description.,
While at first this may appear to be a somewhat lower burden of proof, it
ultimately requires much of the same evidence that is needed under the
detrimental reliance standard.38 In Mauser v. Raytheon Co. Pension Plan
for Salaried Employees, the First Circuit found that the Govoni standard
contained principles of estoppel and therefore "relief is only appropriate if
the participant demonstrates significant or reasonable reliance on the Plan
Summary., 39 Thus, it appears that much of the court's review under the
Govoni standard follows the necessary steps under detrimental reliance.
consider the
This high burden of proof has caused at least the one circuit to
4
0
Govoni standard to be equal to requiring detrimental reliance.
Yet, the difference lies in that the Govoni standard also calls for courts
to make a "separate factual finding on the prejudice issue." ' This provides
the plan participant with another means to recover equitable relief under the
deficient SPD by showing that he was prejudiced by the SPD's language.
The Tenth Circuit explained its reasons for adopting the Govoni
standard as an attempt to find a fair solution that would not bankrupt the
employee benefits system. In Chiles v. Ceridian Corp., the court found
that allowing participants to recover equitable relief at times other than
when they had shown reliance or prejudice would allow participants to
receive a windfall at the expense of their employers. 42 This, in turn would
then "increase costs for employers and their insurers ... [and possibly]
jeopardize the solvency of the plan with respect to the remaining

37. Govoni v. Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers Int'l Union of Am., Local No. 5
Pension Fund, 732 F.2d 250, 252 (1st Cir. 1984).
38. Mauser v. Raytheon Co. Pension Plan for Salaried Employees, 239 F.3d 51, 55 (1st
Cir. 2001).

39. Id.
40. Burstein v. Ret. Account Plan for Employees of Allegheny Health Educ. &
Research Found., 334 F.3d 365, 380 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that the First Circuit "require[s]
reliance.").
41. Aiken v. Policy Mgmt. Sys., Corp., 13 F.3d 138, 142 (4th Cir. 1993).
42. 95 F.3d 1505, 1519 (10th Cir. 1996).
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employees., 43 Thus, by adopting the Govoni standard when dealing with
deficient SPDs, courts have attempted to limit the field of potential
plaintiffs in an attempt to preserve the stability of the benefit plan system in
general, at the expense of those who have not read or relied upon their
faulty SPDs but have still been denied deserved benefits.
3. The "Neither Reliance Nor Prejudice" Standard
Just recently, the Third Circuit adopted a third standard for recovery
under a deficient SPD. In Burstein, the court found that the very same
contract theory, which had provided guidance when the terms of the SPD
conflict with the terms of the policy, could also be instrumental in
considering the proper standard for recovery. The court held that:
just as a court's enforcement of a contract generally does not
require proof that the parties to the contract actually read, and
therefore relied upon, the particular terms of the contract, we are
persuaded that enforcement of an SPD's terms under a claim for
plan benefits does not require a showing of reliance."
This standard does not require plaintiffs to prove either reliance or
prejudice in order to recover under a deficient SPD. Thus, the court found
that since the SPD will always control, any decision should be based upon
the terms in the SPD, as if the master policy was modified to reflect the
changes.
III. BURKE V. KODAK: THE LIKELIHOOD OF PREJUDICE STANDARD
Prior to 2003, the Second Circuit was able to remain untouched by the
controversy that had affected every other circuit. In fact, the Second
Circuit had even gone so far as to decline a previous opportunity to rule on
the issue, instead claiming that "[u]nlike most other circuits, this Court has
not yet decided whether a showing of these factors is ever necessary for a
plaintiff to succeed in an action brought under ERISA. 4 5 Yet, following
an appeal in Burke v. Kodak Retirement Income Plan from District Court
for the Western District of New York, the Second Circuit was finally
forced to weigh in on the controversy.

43. Id.
44. Burstein, 334 F.3d at 381 (italics omitted).
45. Feifer v. Prudential Ins. Co., 306 F.3d 1202, 1213 (2d Cir. 2002).
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A. Background
The facts of the case are relatively straightforward. Mr. Kenneth
Burke was an employee of Eastman Kodak for twenty-seven years until his
death in 1999.46 During his employment, Mr. Burke was a participant in
Kodak's benefits plans, including Kodak's pre-retirement Survivor Income
Benefits ("SIB") plan, which provided "a percentage of an employee's
retirement income benefit to 'an eligible spouse, domestic partner,
dependent child or dependent parent' at the time of the employee's
death."47 In 1991, Mr. Burke began living with his future wife, Sally. As
domestic partners, they shared financial and emotional responsibilities,
including caring for each other's children from prior marriages.48 In March
1999, Mr. Burke was diagnosed with lung cancer and shortly thereafter,
Mr. and Mrs. Burke were married.49 Unfortunately, the marriage had lasted
less than six months when Mr. Burke succumbed to his illness on
November 9, 1999.50 The following week, Kodak sent a letter to Mrs.
Burke detailing the benefits that she could receive as a surviving spouse,
given that the Burkes were married for at least one year.5' Mrs. Burke
alerted Kodak to the fact that she did not meet the definition of a "spouse"
under the plan due to the length of their marriage, and was denied preretirement SIB .52Mrs. Burke appealed the denial maintaining that she
qualified as a "domestic partner" under the plan.53 However, Mrs. Burke's
claim was denied again, this time because the Burkes had failed to file a
joint affidavit stating that they wished to be eligible for "various types of
benefits" as domestic partners.54 Mrs. Burke brought suit against the
Kodak Retirement Income Plan ("KRIP") and the Kodak Retirement
Income Plan Committee ("KRIPCO") in the United States District Court
for the Western District of New York.55 Mrs. Burke's suit relied upon a
suit issued in 1997 and alleged that the defendants had improperly denied
her claim. 56 Mrs. Burke argued that although the SPD made sixteen
references to the filing requirement, none were in the section explaining
SIB. 57 Therefore, Mrs. Burke stated that the SPD was deficient and she
46. Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 2003).
47. Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 217 F. Supp. 2d 384, 388 (W.D.N.Y. 2002)
(emphasis added).
48. Burke, 336 F.3d at 106.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Burke, 336 F.3d at 106.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 106-07
55. Id. at 106.
56. Id. at 106-07.
57. Id. at 109.
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could not be held accountable for the joint-filing requirement. 8
B. The DistrictCourt's Decision
On July 31, 2002, the district court found in favor of the KRIP and the
KRIPCO. Citing previous decisions in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, the
district court held that Kodak's SPD must be read as a whole and that
isolated portions could not be used to go against the general impression of
the document.5 9 Therefore, the court found that the numerous references
throughout the SPD to the filing requirement for domestic partners were
sufficient to provide the Burkes with proper notice of their
responsibilities.6 ° Thus, the court held that the SPD was not deficient due
to the fact that it had not mentioned the requirement in the SIB section.61
However, the district court went on to say this was not the only
problem with Mrs. Burke's claim given that even in the alternative, she had
not shown detrimental reliance upon the deficient section of the SPD.62
The court's conclusion was based on Mrs. Burke's testimony that she had
intentionally not joined Kodak's benefits plans as a domestic partner
because she was "afraid it might not cover pre-existing medical conditions
which had been covered by her employer., 63 Thus, the district court
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed Mrs.
Burke's complaint with prejudice. 64
C. The Second Circuit's Decision
Upon appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, the court reversed the district court's finding that Kodak's SPD
was not deficient.65 The Second Circuit held that while there were sixteen
references to the affidavit requirement in the SPD, the weight to be given
these references was minimal due to the fact that they were spread
throughout the SPD's more than 334 pages.66 The court explained that to
incorporate these clauses into the apparently self-contained SIB section,
Kodak was required to include a cross-reference pointing towards the filing
requirement. 67 The court stated that "a cross-reference would have required
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 110.
Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 217 F. Supp. 2d 384, 389 (W.D.N.Y. 2002).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 389-90.
id. at 390.
Id. at 391.
Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d 103, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2003).
Id.; Burke, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 387 n.1.
Burke, 336 F.3d at 111 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-2(a)-(b) ("where a restriction
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minimal effort and diligence to insert [and a] plan participant should not be
expected to infer the eligibility requirements for SIB by reference to other
self-contained benefits sections of the SPD."68 While Kodak had made the
necessary changes in both an employee newsletter and a benefits update, it
never corrected an updated version of the SPD.69 For these reasons, the
court found that Kodak's SPD conflicted with the terms of the master
policy and therefore was deficient.7"
The Second Circuit also rejected the district court's dictum that Mrs.
Burke's testimony "preclude[d] a finding of detrimental reliance."'" Yet,
instead of reviewing the trial record to determine whether Mrs. Burke did
rely upon the deficient SPD, the Second Circuit began its own analysis of
the different standards that had been adopted by the other circuits.72
In rejecting the detrimental reliance standard, the Second Circuit held
that:
"[a] rule requiring ... detrimental reliance.., imposes an
insurmountable hardship on many plaintiffs," especially on the
estate of a deceased participant, and "such a rule hardly advances
the Congressional purpose of protecting the beneficiaries of
ERISA plans by insuring that employees are fully and accurately
apprised of their rights under the plan. 73
The Second Circuit also reviewed the prejudice standards adopted by
a number of circuits.74 In ultimately rejecting these standards as well, the
Second Circuit held that they did not place enough of the burden upon
employers for creating faulty SPDs. The court found that employees had
no influence upon the drafting of the SPDs and were in a much more
limited position to absorb the financial hardships that could result from a
deficient SPD. In addition, employers could receive a benefit from drafting
a faulty SPD: "a defense against certain state law claims., 76 Therefore, the
court determined that even a prejudice standard was too heavy a burden to
place on employees.

on benefits is not 'in close conjunction' with a description of the benefits, cross-referencing
is generally required").
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 111-12.
72. Id. at 111-14.
73. Id. at 112 (quoting Estate of Ritzer v. Nat'l Org. of Indus. Trade Unions Ins. Trust
Fund Hosp., 822 F. Supp. 951, 955-56 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)).
74. Id. at 113.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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Thus, the Second Circuit created its own "likelihood of prejudice"
standard for recovery under a deficient SPD.77 In hopes of preventing
further confusion from the district courts, the Second Circuit explained the
likelihood of prejudice standard:
[W]e require for a showing of prejudice, that a plan participant or
beneficiary was likely to have been harmed as a result of the
deficient SPD. Where a participant makes this initial showing,
however, the employer may rebut it through evidence that the
deficient SPD was in effect a harmless error.78
Applying the likelihood of prejudice standard to Mrs. Burke's claim,
the Second Circuit held that Kodak's deficient SPD was likely to have
harmed the Burkes. 79 The court found that the absence of the filing
requirement from the SIB section of SPD was likely to lead plan
participants, such as the Burkes, to believe that they were eligible for the
pre-retirement benefits without filing the necessary papers. Thus, the court
held that
the Burkes "suffered prejudice as a result of Kodak's deficient
,,80
SPD.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SPD TESTS

Before a proper analysis can be done on the current circuit split
regarding the standard for recovery from a deficient SPD, a decision must
first be made upon what constitutes an SPD. The two competing tests
described previously each offer advantages and disadvantages in terms of
their abilities to arrive at a result that is statutorily correct, consistent, and
fair.
The Hicks test focuses solely upon the fairness to individual cases by
creating fact specific test which is based upon the employer's intent and the
employee's reasonable belief that the plan document was an SPD.
However, while this may provide a fair result to the parties involved, the
test ignores the statutory language of 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b), which states that
an SPD "shall" have certain identified categories. 8' According to the Hicks
test, a plan document could be found to be an SPD, despite the fact that it
does not contain many of the characteristics that Congress envisioned, as
long as the parties subjectively treated the document as an SPD. Such a
loose rule on what constitutes an SPD goes against the statutory language
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 113-14.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 114.
29 U.S.C. § 1022(b) (2000).
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of ERISA, in addition to creating a likelihood of inconsistency.
Furthermore, the uniform adoption of the Hicks test would provide parties
with little guidance for creating legally-valid SPDs, leading to an increase
in both the number and costs of SPD-related litigations. Thus, it appears
that the Hicks test, while increasing the likelihood of a fair result in
individual cases, has the ability to produce systemic solutions that are
contrary to the statutory language and intent of 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b).
While the Gridley test is an improvement over the Hicks standard in
certain areas, it also has serious implications that ultimately make it as
flawed as the test it was designed to replace. By establishing a bright-line
rule requiring the inclusion of all of the categories listed by 29 U.S.C. §
1022(b), the Gridley test conforms to the language of the statute and
provides for consistency in judicial decisions. However, this consistency
could be used by unscrupulous employers to intentionally draft deficient
SPDs so as to limit their liability all at the expense of their less legallyinformed plan participants. This unanticipated result runs counter to the
legislative intent behind ERISA, which was meant to increase, not
decrease, the protections offered to employee benefit plan participants.82
Since neither test is able to completely conform to both the language
and intent of Congress when enacting 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b), it is up to
Congress to revise the statute to provide a clearer picture of what should be
considered an SPD. I believe a standard similar to the Gridley test should
be codified, with a caveat that allows courts to opt out of the bright-line
rule in cases where the plan participant can demonstrate that the plan
administrator intentionally drafted a deficient SPD. Yet, until Congress
acts, I believe that the Gridley test is the lesser of the two evils, as it
provides the result most consistent with ERISA.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

Turning to the current debate surrounding the appropriate standard for
recovery under a deficient SPD, each theory adopted by the courts has its
strengths and weaknesses.
A. Detrimentalor SubstantialReliance Standard
The detrimental or substantial reliance standards as adopted by the
courts pose a significant challenge to employee benefit plan participants
who wish to recover damages because of a deficient SPD. Both of these
theories are based upon the notion that a plaintiff must have read the SPD

82. Paul J. Schnader & Barbara W. Freeman, eds., ERISA: A
1.6-1.9 (2d ed. 2003).
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and taken steps to his detriment based upon the flaws in the document.
While this standard undeniably prevents the flood of potential plaintiffs
that can be found under less strict standards, it does so by creating a
significant bar in favor of plan administrators, even after it has been shown
that the administrator erred in providing an inaccurate summary plan to its
employees. Questions remain concerning whether plan participants who
rely upon another's oral explanation of the terms of the deficient SPD, as
opposed to reading it, have still "relied" upon the SPD.
In addition, many of the decisions made regarding employee benefits
plans do not lead themselves to demonstrating detrimental reliance. Often
the plaintiffs actions as a result of a deficient SPD are indirect or delayed.
Under detrimental reliance no responsibility is placed upon the plan
administrator, who is in a much better position to understand its own
benefits policies, for negligent and perhaps even intentional
misrepresentations. Thus, I do not believe that the detrimental reliance
standard properly distributes the effects that a deficient SPD may have,
given the abilities of the respective parties to account for the potential
consequences.
B. Burstein-ContractualTheory
In its evolutionary view of ERISA under general contract principles,
as opposed to the estoppel doctrine adopted by most other circuits, the
Third Circuit found a great deal of statutory support for its conclusion in
Burstein.83 It seems like common sense that a benefit plan should be
treated as a contract between the employer and its employees, with each
SPD as a summary of the contract's terms. Just as with a contract, it is not
necessary that plaintiffs actually read or rely on the terms of the SPD in
order to recover damages under it. Furthermore, by adopting such a low
burden for potential plaintiffs, opponents to Burstein can argue that the
Third Circuit's standard may actually encourage additional SPD litigation.
This theory is that plan participants, who were unable to recover under
alternative standards, will attempt to find some deficiency in the
employer's SPD to recover lost benefits they were not even aware that they
were eligible for. A dramatic increase, such as this, could potentially
bankrupt the entire employee benefits plan system. Thus, by not restricting
the number of potential plaintiffs at all under ERISA, the Burstein standard
could cause more harm than good by forcing employee plan participants to
pay for the costs of the increased liability that plan administrators may face.

83. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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C. Burke-Likelihood of Prejudice
In Burke, the Second Circuit avoided the problems that many of the
other circuits have run into when adopting the Govoni standard. By instead
creating its own likelihood of prejudice standard, the court recognized the
difficulties that employee benefits plan participants would face by proving
detrimental reliance given the nature of the situation. 84 Instead, the court in
Burke placed a less burdensome standard upon plaintiffs alleging lost
benefits because of a deficient SPD. This was meant to account for the
employer's responsibility for the SPD in the first place, along with the
employer's ability to better mitigate the harm caused.85
Yet, I am not sure if the court's presumption for the plan participant
goes far enough to fashion an equal playing field between the employer and
employee. Furthermore, the Second Circuit's standard leaves a great deal
of discretion to the district judge's opinion. I believe that if this standard is
to adequately protect the congressional objectives of ERISA, it must find
some way to provide employees with more protection, through a consistent
and equal recovery standard.
D. The Best Standard:A Combinationof Burke and Burstein
After review of the arguments made by all three sides of the issue, I
believe that the proper standard is some combination of the rules adopted
by the courts in Burstein and Burke. Although I agree with the analysis
used by both courts, and the resulting standards which place the burden
upon employers for faulty SPDs, I do not feel that either court has been
able to appropriately balance the Congressional intentions of ERISA with
the overall public interest in a stable benefits plan system. The employee is
in the worst position of all the parties to absorb the financial costs of
deficient SPDs. However, the low bar provided by Burstein could have
disastrous consequences upon the employee benefits plan system, as the
unplanned increase in litigation awards could cause numerous employee
benefits plan administrators to drastically increase plan participants'
premiums, or even force some into bankruptcy to avoid the additional
liability. Thus, while the courts are getting perpetually closer to a standard
that is able to properly distribute responsibility and financial ability to
absorb the consequences of a deficient SPD, they must always be wary of
any rule which would end up harming the very employee plan participants
that ERISA was originally enacted to protect.

84. Burke, 336 F.3d at 111.
85. Id. at 113.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Since the adoption of ERISA in 1974, the SPD requirement, while an
important tool for employee benefit plan participants, has caused a great
deal of disagreement among the courts trying to interpret Congress's intent.
This confusion has not only applied to what exactly Congress wished to be
considered an SPD, but also the procedure for resolving SPDs that conflict
with the terms of the master plan. The results of this confusion have led to
a three-way circuit split regarding the appropriate standard of recovery
under a different SPD. The most important issue for the courts to resolve
lies in balancing the competing interests of congressional intent in enacting
the SPD requirement in ERISA, while at the same time ensuring not to
cause the bankruptcy of the entire employee benefits plan system.
However, encouragement can be taken in the new developments, which
deal with comparisons made between ERISA and contract law, and could
be responsible for breaking the deadlock, especially since the Supreme
Court has shown no interest in becoming entangled in this issue.86 I believe
that despite the problems in interpreting the SPD requirement in ERISA
over the past two decades, the next several years will be influential, as
either there will be congressional intervention or the adoption of a uniform
standard by the courts, and the fate of millions of employee benefit plan
participants, as well as billons of dollars of lost benefits will finally be
resolved.

86. Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2003) cert. denied, 124 S.
Ct. 1046 (2004) (refusing to address the circuit split on the SPD requirement).

